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Experience in other industries has shown that revenue management can increase revenue without 
affecting customer satisfaction. Revenue management, however, is underutilised in the golf industry, as 
customers are believed to perceive such practices as unacceptable and unfair. This paper explores six 
revenue management practices that might be suitable in a golf context and examines their perceived 
fairness. The results show that golfers perceive arrival duration control practices in the form of 
reservation fees or no-show fees as fair. In addition, it was found that golfers perceive demand-based 
pricing in the form of coupons (two for the price of one), time-of-day and reduced tee time intervals as 
fair. Conversely, time-of-booking pricing was perceived as neutral to slightly unfair. 
Varying price levels were seen as unfair, with potential negative consumer reactions to this practice. 
Furthermore, the paper explores whether framing demand-based pricing as discounts rather than 
surcharges would make a difference. It was found that demand-based pricing presented as discounts 
were generally seen as fairer and therefore less likely to have a negative impact on consumer 




Revenue management has been widely adopted in the airline, hotel and rental car industries (Hanks et 
al., 1992; Smith et al., 1992; Carroll and Grimes, 1995), but has only recently gained attention in the golf 
industry (Kimes, 2000; Kimes and Schruben, 2002). Companies using revenue management have 
reported revenue increases of 2–5 per cent (Hanks et al., 1992; Smith et al., 1992), and the potential 
revenue gain for the golf industry can be substantial. 
 Revenue management consists of two strategic levers: duration control and demand-based 
pricing (Kimes and Chase, 1998; Kimes, 2000). Golf courses have been willing to try managing duration 
(Kimes, 2000) but have been reluctant to apply demand-based pricing because of fears of possible 
customer dissatisfaction. While golf courses do use demand-based pricing when offering higher prices 
on weekends and promotions such as twilight specials and league play, they have been loathe to vary 
price by time of day, time of booking or condition of play.  
 Golf is a popular sport in the USA, with over 25 million players. In 2002, there were over 17,000 
golf courses in the USA, of which nearly 13,000 were open to the public. The average greens fee was $40 
at public courses and $36 at municipal courses, and $16.3bn was spent on greens fees and dues 
(National Golf Foundation, 2002). The focus of this research was on the customers of high-end daily 
greens-fee courses. 
 Golf course operators may well have support for their fears in the fairness literature. 
Researchers have found that customers will refuse to patronise companies perceived as unfair. If 
demand-based pricing in golf courses is viewed as unfair by golfers, the golf course may suffer a loss of 
business. The intent of this research was to determine how customers react to revenue management 






Revenue management is the application of information systems and pricing strategies to allocate the 
right capacity to the right customer at the right place at the right time. The determination of ‘right’ 
entails achieving the most contribution possible for the golf course, while also delivering the greatest 
value or utility to the customer. In practice, revenue management has meant setting prices according to 
predicted demand levels so that price-sensitive customers who are willing to purchase at off-peak times 
can do so at favourable prices, while price-insensitive customers who want to purchase at peak times 
will be able to do so. The application of revenue management applied to operations that have a 
relatively fixed capacity, demand that is variable and uncertain, perishable inventory, appropriate cost 
and pricing structure, and varying customer price sensitivity. Those attributes are found in the golf 
industry. 
 Golf courses possess many of the characteristics that call for revenue management, but little 
evidence is seen of managers using a strategic approach for deploying the demand-management 
mechanisms at hand. A successful revenue-management strategy is predicated on effective control of 
customer demand. Two strategic levers for golf course revenue management are available: duration 
management and demand-based pricing (Kimes and Chase, 1998). 
 Different industries are subject to different combinations of duration control and variable 
pricing (see Table 1). Industries traditionally associated with revenue management (hotels, airlines, car-
rental firms and cruise lines) are able to apply variable pricing for a product that has a specified or 
predictable duration (Quadrant 2). Movie theatres, performing-arts centres, arenas and convention 
centres charge a fixed price for a product of predictable duration (Quadrant 1), while golf courses, 
restaurants and most Internet service providers charge a fixed price but face a relatively unpredictable 
duration of customer use (Quadrant 3). Some healthcare services charge variable prices (eg HMOs, 
Medicare versus private pay), and some may try to control the duration of use (Quadrant 4). The lines 
dividing the quadrants are broken because in reality no fixed demarcation point exists between 
quadrants. Thus, an industry (such as golf) may have attributes from more than one quadrant. 
 Golf course operators can use round duration control and variable pricing to help maximise their 
revenue per available tee time. Round duration can be managed by reducing the uncertainty of arrival, 
by reducing the uncertainty of duration and/ or by reducing the tee time interval so that more golfers 
can be served. Variable pricing can be implemented by developing optimal prices and by setting rules to 
determine who is charged which price. These techniques have been thoroughly discussed in an earlier 
paper (Kimes, 2000) 
 
Fairness 
Golf courses are often reluctant to use revenue management tools because of potential customer 
backlash. Customers may perceive revenue management practices as unfair, and researchers have 
found that fair behaviour as seen by customers is instrumental to the maximisation of long-term profits 
(Thaler 1985; Kahneman et al., 1986a, b). 
  The issue of fairness has been studied extensively in the field of marketing in a variety of non-
hospitality industries (Thaler, 1985; Kahneman et al., 1986a, b; Urbany et al., 1989; Kaufmann et al., 
1991; Campbell, 1999a, b) and Kimes (1994) studied perceived fairness in the hotel and airline 
industries. In discussions on perceived fairness, the terms ‘reference transaction’ and ‘reference price’ 
are often used. A reference transaction is how customers think a transaction should be conducted, and a 
reference price is how much customers think a service should cost. Reference prices come from market 
prices, posted prices and past experience with the company. For example, customers may know that 
they generally pay about $75 to play golf at a particular course, and so the reference price for a round of 




The principle of dual entitlement holds that most customers believe that they are entitled to a 
reasonable price and that firms are entitled to a reasonable profit (Thaler, 1985) Two hypotheses 
emerge from that principle: 
 
(1) Customers feel that raising the price to maintain profits is fair. That means if costs increase, 
customers consider it reasonable for the price of the service to also increase. 
 
(2) Customers believe that raising the price to increase profits is unfair. For example, after Hurricane 
Andrew in the early 1990s, many companies charged significantly increased prices for food, water and 
supplies. As predicted by the principle of dual entitlement, consumers considered these practices 
extremely unfair (Campbell, 1999a). 
 
Furthermore, customers believe that the value to the firm should equal the value to the customer 
(Kahneman et al., 1986a, b). If that relationship becomes unbalanced by increasing the value to the firm 
or decreasing the value to the customer, the customer may view subsequent transactions as unfair. 
For example, if a golf course increases its greens fees for no apparent reasons, it is increasing the firm’s 
value without increasing the customer’s value. The customer may then view the transaction as unfair. 
Similarly, if a golf course imposes substantial restrictions on customers in exchange for only a marginally 
lower price, customers may also view the transaction as unfair. 
 If the principle of dual entitlement holds true, revenue management may be perceived as unfair. 
If customers believe that the transaction is different from the reference transaction only in price, they 
may believe that the firm is receiving more than its reference price and is behaving unfairly. The 
experimental research of Kahneman et al. (1986a, b) indicates the willingness on the part of the subject 




Fenced prices are designed to allow customers to segment themselves based on their willingness to pay, 
behaviour and needs (Hanks et al., 1992). Fences offer consumers discounted prices but impose rules 
and regulations at every level of discount to balance the perceived value for the different market 
segments, and to avoid automatically offering a discount to customers who are willing to pay a higher 
price (Hanks et al., 1992). Types of fences include requirements for advance purchase, advance 
payment, cancellation and change restrictions, refund penalties, time of usage restrictions and minimum 
consumption quantities. For example, airlines offer many different fares, but in order to qualify for a 
deeply discounted fare, customers may have to make their reservation and purchase the ticket far in 
advance, stay over a Saturday night and accept cancellation penalties. The business traveler who is 
unwilling to accept the restrictions does not qualify for the lower rate and usually ends up paying a 
higher fare. 
 The purpose of a rate fence is to segment customers and justify why different people pay 
different prices. In order to be perceived as fair, fences need to be logical, transparent, upfront and fixed 
so that they cannot be circumvented (Bennett, 1984). 
 Essentially, there are two types of rate fence that companies can use to customize their prices: 
physical and non-physical (Hanks et al., 1992). Physical rate fences include physical location, furnishings, 
presence of amenities or view, while nonphysical rate fences include time of consumption, transaction 
characteristics, buyer characteristics and controlled availability (Dolan and Simon, 1996). 
 Physical rate fences for golf courses might include inclusion of a cart, the use of a better course, 
or amenities (free lessons, hats or food and beverage). Non-physical rate fences might include time 
(weekend mornings might cost more or rounds played after before 2 pm might cost less), transaction 
characteristics (golfers who make a reservation over a month ahead of time might pay less), buyer 
characteristics (frequent customers might pay less), or controlled availability (customers with coupons 
will pay less). 
 The purpose of any rate fence is to ensure that customers who are willing to pay a higher price 
are not arbitrarily sold the product at a lower price. When developing rate fences, golf course operators 
must make sure that the rate fences are easy to explain and administer and that customers can 
understand the reasoning behind them. 
 
Framing of price differences 
 
Behavioural decision theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) holds that the way in which an alternative is 
presented (its framing) affects its evaluation. Frames that emphasise customer gains are preferable to 
economically equivalent frames that emphasise customer losses. In the context of revenue 
management, it would therefore be expected that consumers would evaluate a situation framed as a 
price discount more favourably than a situation presented as a price surcharge or increase. For example, 
consider a golf course that decides to charge a $20 higher greens fee for rounds played before 10 am on 
a Saturday morning than for rounds played between 10 am and noon on the same day. They can present 
the price differences in two ways: they can either present the late morning greens fees as $20 lower 
than early morning prices or they can present the early morning prices as $20 higher than late morning 
prices. The situations are economically equivalent, but behavioural decision theory would hold that 
customers would view the $20 lower prices more favourably, and that the golf course should frame the 
price difference accordingly. This study explored the impact of framing on the perceived fairness of 




Golf courses can vary price by time of week, by time of day, by when the tee time was booked, through 
the use of coupons, and by the tee time interval. They can also use price to help reduce no-show rates 
by imposing no-show or reservation fees. Again, demand-based pricing is only successful if customers 
view the practices as fair. In an attempt to understand how golfers view various revenue management 
practices, surveys were sent to a randomly selected sample of 1,000 golfers. Troon Golf, a golf 
management company that manages over 100 golf courses around the world, provided names and 
addresses from their one-million-customer database. This study restricted the sample to US golfers who 
had recently played at high-end daily greens-fee courses. 
 
 The survey included six scenario-based questions and two demographic questions. 
The respondents were asked to evaluate each scenario on a scale of 1 (extremely acceptable) to 7 
(extremely unacceptable). Two versions of the survey were used. The questions on both versions were 
identical with the exception of the wording of six demand-based pricing scenarios, in order to see 
whether customers reacted differently based on how the price differences were framed. Specifically, 
two frames (surcharge and discount) were used for time-of-day pricing and varying price levels, and 
two-for-one coupons were framed with restrictions with positive wording (valid on) versus a wording 
with exclusions (not valid on). Pricing fences using advance booking were explored with either lower 
fees for advance booking a longer time period in advance or lower fees for a shorter time period in 
advance. Finally, pricing based on tee time interval was explored as this is potentially an important 
duration control lever. An overview of all manipulations is provided in Table 2. 
 The one-page survey was mailed in October 2001, and a postage-paid envelope was included. Of 
the 1,000 mailed questionnaires, 102 surveys were returned because of insufficient or incorrect 
addresses. Of the remaining surveys, 296 were returned, resulting in an effective response rate of 33.0 




The summary findings are presented in Table 3 and Figure 1, and detailed findings on the revenue 




Four different pricing practices were evaluated: time-of-day pricing, varying price levels, two-for-one 
coupon programmes and time of booking. 
 
Time of day pricing 
 
Golf courses typically have higher demand on weekends and particularly high demand during the early 
morning hours on weekends. If they charge a premium for early morning weekend play, they should be 
able to increase revenue while maintaining customer volume. 
  
 Respondents were presented with one of the following scenarios, ie either the discount scenario 
or the premium scenario (the latter is presented in parentheses), and were asked to evaluate its 
fairness: 
 A golf course has two sets of weekend morning prices. If you play between 10 am and noon 
(before 10 am), the price is 20 per cent lower (higher) than if you play before (after) 10 am.  
 
In general, customers rated time-of-day pricing as acceptable (mean=3.41). When the price was 
presented as a discount, customers viewed it as significantly more acceptable (mean=2.96) than when it 
was presented as a premium (mean = 3.92; t = 3.91; p < 0.001). 
 This implies that golf courses can charge different prices for different times of day without 
incurring customer wrath. Furthermore, the findings imply that a golf course should frame the price 
difference as a discount rather than as a premium. 
 
Varying price levels 
 
Many golf course professionals are concerned with how customers would react to varying price levels. 
This study wanted to explore varying price levels that were not easily understood by customers. This 
issue follows closely the varying price points generated by sophisticated revenue management systems 
where prices for any given day can change rapidly over time as a function of updated demand 
predictions for that particular time slot. The respondents were asked to evaluate the following 
scenarios: 
 
 A golfer plays at the same course at the same time every Saturday morning in 
October. The posted rate is $60. Some weeks your greens fee is $50 ($75) and other times your greens 
fee is $75 ($50). 
 
Respondents viewed varying price levels as extremely unacceptable (mean=6.16). The reaction 
remained the same regardless of whether the question was phrased with a high reference price first 
(mean=6.16), or the low reference price first (mean=6.17). This implies that golf courses should strive to 
maintain consistent pricing policies. If a golfer pays a particular price for an 8:30 am tee time on 
Saturday one week, he/she should pay the same price the following week. 
 
Two-for-one coupon programme 
 
Many golf courses use two-for-one coupon programmes to try to build business during low demand 
periods. The intent of this question was to assess the perceived fairness of this practice and to 
determine the best way in which to position such a programme. Respondents were asked to evaluate 
the following scenarios: 
 
 A golf course participates in a two-for-one coupon programme. Customers can use the coupons 
for two-for-one rounds at any time except on Saturday or Sunday mornings (on Mondays 
through Fridays and on Saturday and Sunday afternoons).  
 
Two-for-one coupon programmes were viewed as extremely acceptable (mean=1.80). Respondents 
viewed the practice as more acceptable when presented as not having restrictions (mean=1.62) than 
when it was presented as having restrictions (mean = 1.96; t = 2.02; p < 0.05). This implies that golf 
courses should consider using two-for-one coupon programmes, and that these programmes should be 





Some golf courses charge more for reservations that are made far in advance, and others charge more 
for reservations that are made very close to the date of play. The reasons for this vary and are generally 
related to market dynamics and the type of customers served. The intent of this question was to 
determine how customers view time-of-booking prices and whether they prefer premiums for early 
reservations or for late reservations. Respondents were asked to evaluate the following scenarios: 
 
 You step up on the fourth tee and a member of the group you were paired with mentions that 
for ‘$90, this course is a great value!’ You and your partner paid $120. After a brief discussion, 
you discover that the other twosome booked 4 (14) days in advance, while you booked 14 (4) 
days in advance. 
 
Overall, time-of-booking pricing was considered moderately unacceptable (mean = 5.12). When a lower 
price was offered to customers who booked later, the practice was viewed as unacceptable (mean = 
5.99). Conversely, customers viewed the practice as marginally acceptable, if the lower greens fee was 
offered to customers who booked earlier rather than later (mean = 4.22; t = 7.53; p < 0.001). 
 This finding implies that golf courses should approach time-of-booking pricing carefully. If they 
decide to pursue this practice, they should offer discounts to customers who book early and charge 




Reservation fee/no-show fee  
 
Many golf courses face a serious no-show problem (Delgado-Muerza, 2000). Golf courses can overbook 
and/or charge either a reservation fee or a no-show fee. Even though some golf courses require a credit 
card guarantee for the entire greens fees for all reservations, they often have difficulty in collecting the 
no-show revenue from the credit card companies. Restaurants have experimented with the idea of a 
reservation or no-show fee and have met with great success. The intent of these questions was to 
determine how golfers viewed reservations and no-show fees. Respondents were presented with the 
following scenarios: 
 
 Reservation fee: 
 A golf course has a $20 reservation fee. If you honour your reservation, the fee is waived, but if 
 you do not honour your reservation, you are charged the reservation fee. 
 
 No-show fee: 
 A golf course charges a $20 no-show fee per person. If you honour your reservation, you are not 
 charged the fee, but if you fail to show up, you are charged the no-show fee. 
 
Respondents considered a reservation fee to be acceptable (mean=3.14). This implies that a golf course 
should consider using a reservation fee in lieu of trying to collect the full amount of the greens fee from 
customers, or in lieu of not charging anything at all. The size of the reservation fee seems large enough 
to cause customers to be more responsible for cancelling their reservation but not large enough to 
create customer dissatisfaction. 
 Similarly, no-show fees were viewed as acceptable (mean=3.24). This implies that golf courses 
can impose no-show fees for customers who do not honour their reservation and still be perceived as 
behaving fairly. In addition, it does not seem to matter if the fee is framed as a reservation fee or as a 
no-show fee (mean=3.19, t=0.57, p=0.57). 
 
Tee time interval pricing 
 
Many golfers complain about crowded golf courses, and some golfers prefer a longer tee time interval 
between parties. A longer tee time interval means that the golf course cannot serve as many customers, 
and unless an increased greens fee was charged, the golf course would lose revenue. The intent of this 
question was to determine how customers viewed an increased greens fee for a longer tee time 
interval. The respondents were asked to evaluate the following scenario: 
 
 Most golf courses schedule tee times every 8 or 9 minutes. One golf course schedules tee times 
every 15 minutes, but charges 30 per cent more than other courses. 
 
This practice was considered to be acceptable (mean=3.95). This implies that if a golf course offers a 
longer tee time interval than its competition, it can charge a premium without upsetting customers. 
Capacity implications and contribution need to be considered, however. The time points and pricing 
used in the present study are not revenue/minute neutral, as the fee increase does not fully 
compensate for the capacity reduction caused by the longer tee time. Should the golf course run most 




Respondents were asked to indicate their frequency of play and their geographic location. The intent of 
both questions was to determine whether the frequency of play or the geographic location was related 
to the perceived fairness of the seven different scenarios. One-way and two-way ANOVAs were run to 
explore potential main and interaction effects with our independent variables. Frequency of play was 
insignificant (p>0.10), while geographic location was insignificant (p>0.10) for all but time of booking 
(p<0.05) and the no show fee (p<0.10). 
 In general, the geographic location did not matter, but respondents living in the Southwestern 
USA were significantly more accepting (mean=4.60) of time-of-booking pricing than respondents living in 
the Midwestern USA (mean=5.52). This finding has face validity, as the general thought of the golf 
company is that the golfers in the Midwest and Southwest are quite different. The Southwestern golfers 
usually have access to year-round play, have quite a few more choices and are considered to be more 
sophisticated customers, and have quite a few more choices, while Midwestern golfers are generally 
limited to about six months of golfing per year. Finally, none of the interaction effects reached 
significance (p>0.10). 
 In summary, the findings on the demographic background suggest that the findings are 
reasonably robust and generalisable, at least across the geographic locations and golfing frequency 
categories examined in this study. 
 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
In general, customers view the golf revenue management practices studied as acceptable. The survey 
results indicate that golfers consider time-of-day pricing to be acceptable, particularly if framed as a 
discount. Two-for-one coupon programmes were considered very acceptable. Time-of-booking pricing 
was considered as moderately unacceptable, especially when a discount was given to customers who 
booked shortly before the day of the tee-off. Respondents viewed varying price levels as extremely 
unacceptable. Reservation and no-show fees were considered acceptable and golf courses should 
consider using them as a method for reducing no-show rates. Finally, charging a premium for an 
increased tee time interval was viewed as acceptable. 
 These findings provide golf course operators with broad acceptance levels, but do not guarantee 
that all customers may willingly accept demand-based pricing practices. Therefore, when developing 
demand based pricing using fences, golf course operators must make sure that the rate fences are easy 
to explain and administer, and that customers can understand the reasoning behind them. This will 
make it easier for the front-line employees to pacify unhappy customers and recover the service if 
necessary. Also, the positioning of revenue management internally to staff and externally to customers 
should be as a win–win situation. It needs to be emphasised that the pricing does allow patrons to self-
segment and by having tight fences, patrons who see high value in a good tee time are much more likely 
to get the capacity and service they value (Wirtz et al., 2001). This way, increasing profitability via 
revenue management does not have to come at the expense of customer satisfaction and loyalty. 
 Apart from framing of price fences, other marketing tools can be adopted to make revenue 
management more acceptable for the golfers. Price bundling and categorizing of the service according 
to some minor differing characteristics can help to manage customer conflicts arising from 
discriminatory pricing (Wirtz et al., 2001). Price bundling allows the golf course to offer various price 
tiers, thus making it harder for golfers to compare prices. This will then reduce the likelihood of 
perceived unfairness. Likewise, rate fences that are clearly presented to golfers that are transparent, 
logical and perceptible can increase total consumer satisfaction. 
 This study represents some of the first research on customer reaction to golf revenue 
management practices. The sample was restricted to USA customers of high-end daily greens-fee 
courses, so results may not be generalisable to other levels of courses and/or countries. Future research 
could replicate the rate fences studied in this paper for different levels of public courses in both the USA 
and other countries. Other rate fences, such as length of play, age or free cart usage could be explored 
in future work. 
 While this research was restricted to daily greens-fee courses, it could also be extended to 
private clubs. For example, private clubs could offer different types of memberships (ie full access, 
afternoons only, weekdays only) in an attempt to increase revenue. 
 Also, no-shows represent a major problem for many golf courses, and although some courses 
required credit card guarantees, they have had great difficulty in successfully collecting when customers 
do not honour their reservations. Additional research on methods golf courses could use to better 
manage and reduce no-shows would be quite useful. 
 In addition to the main effects studies in this paper, future work could explore potential 
moderating variables that might qualify the main effects found here. For example, income, level of 
education and familiarity with the various fences, perhaps from other industries, might affect the 
acceptance of revenue management practices. Also, the current study did not consider the psychological 
processes involved in reactions to the price fences, such as affective reactions to gains and losses in 
specific purchase or usage situations (Linville and Fischer, 1991). Similarly, the perceived motives and 
reputation of the golf course were not looked into in the current study. 
ageFrom a practitioner perspective, this research could be extended to include capacity utilisation 
strategies issues beyond revenue management, such as customer development, bundling, and 
differentiation might be explored (See eg Ng et al., 1999) Finally, research into implementation of golf 
revenue management practices, such as training of reservation agents and facility staff, integration with 
other information technology systems and effective customer communication would be a fruitful and 




In conclusion, it was found that golfers generally accepted most of the revenue  management practices 
studied. This has considerable implications for both researchers and golf course operators as revenue 
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